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Abstract: On the Observational Equivalence of Devaluation and Monetary Policy
Russell S. Boyer, University of Western Ontario, January 31, 2005
This paper will be presented at the CRIF Seminar Series,
Frank J Petrilli Center for Research in International Finance,
The Graduate School of Business Administration,
Fordham University (Lincoln Center Campus),
Room 614
113 West 60th Street (between 9th and 10th Avenues)
New York City, NY
Friday, February 11, 2005, at 11:00am.
Devaluation has been viewed as being quite different from monetary policy (Caves, Cooper,
Ethier, Frankel, Frenkel, Harberger, Johnson, Jones, Kenen, McCallum, Mussa, Salvatore,
Tsiang) or even just the opposite of it in terms of its effects on real variables (Berglas,
Dornbusch, Mundell).
This paper yields to the temptation that Allen and Kenen set out: to follow one’s intuition and
come to the clear conclusion that these two policy initiatives are very similar. It does this by
specifying the conditions under which the two are identical in the small-country setting with a
general degree of management of the exchange rate. The key requirement is that the markets for
the enactment of these two policies be the same in the two cases; or be effectively the same, as
perfect capital mobility guarantees in one of the specific examples that Allen and Kenen treat.
The reason that Berglas, Dornbusch, and Mundell come to their extraordinary conclusion is that
in their models money is the only financial instrument that is available to be held by domestic
residents. The exchange rate on their view is being pegged in the money-goods market, rather
than the way it is conventionally done in modern industrialized economies, in the money-capital
market. It should not be surprising that their results do not conform with intuition.
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1. Introduction
Every textbook dealing with international finance makes a clear distinction between the effects
of devaluation and the effects of expansionary monetary policy. While one’s intuition may
suggest that these two policies must be very similar, modern treatments of them have come to
quite a different conclusion. Johnson [1958] declared devaluation to be an “expenditure
switching” policy, while monetary policy is an “expenditure changing” policy. Others, notably
Mundell [1967], Dornbusch [1973], and Berglas [1974], have concluded that the two policies are
diametrically opposed. They argue that in order to achieve the same impacts on real variables a
devaluation and monetary contraction are perfect substitutes.
This paper gives our intuition a primary role to play in the analysis. It does this by yielding to
the temptation that Allen and Kenen [1980] set out in their comparison of these policies:
although they reject this finding in their own work, we come to the clear conclusion that these
two policy initiatives are very similar. We do this by specifying the conditions under which the
two policies are identical in the small-country setting with a general degree of management of
the exchange rate. The key requirement is that the markets for the enactment of these two
policies be the same in the two cases; or be effectively the same, as perfect capital mobility
guarantees in one of the examples that Allen and Kenen treat.
The reason that Berglas, Dornbusch, and Mundell come to their extraordinary conclusion is that
in their models money is the only financial instrument that is available to be held by domestic
residents. The exchange rate on their view is being pegged in the money-goods market, rather
than the way it is conventionally done in modern industrialized economies, in the money-capital
market. It should not be surprising that their results do not conform with intuition.
If the markets in which the exchange rate is stabilized are the same as the markets in which a
monetary policy initiative occurs, then the identity between these two policies is quickly
established, as the discussion in sections 2 and 3 makes clear. Section 4 shows that this identity
remains even if the degree of management of the exchange rate differs as between the two cases
of policy initiative. Section 5 demonstrates that within this model the Berglas-DornbuschMundell result holds for changes in nominal wealth, but questions whether that is the appropriate
interpretation of the mechanism which gives monetary policy its force.
The remaining sections of the paper refocus on the way in which the exchange rate moves as the
steady-state is attained. It is shown that the degree of management of the exchange rate during
this transition period influences the extent to which the exchange rate adjusts and therefore is a
determinant of the quantity of domestic currency demanded. It is this effect that causes the
instantaneous equilibrium to depend on the degree of stabilization, and therefore can generate a
difference between the consequences of devaluation and expansionary monetary policy.
Nonetheless our overall conclusion is that to a first approximation these two expressions are
different names for a single policy initiative.
At the end of the paper we provide a brief review of current journals and textbooks in order to
remind the reader how much this conclusion is at variance with what one finds in the recent
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literature.
2. The Model
Consider a small open economy which trades in goods and financial assets with the rest of
the world, and is not committed to a particular exchange rate regime with respect to the currencies of
its trading partners. Indeed, a major focus of our analysis is on the consequences which the nature of
the exchange rate regime has for the effects of two nominal policy initiatives: devaluation and
monetary policy. Instead of assuming that the exchange rate regime is either of the two polar types,
fixed (pegged but adjustable) and flexible exchange rates, the view is that the exchange rate is
managed by intervention in the money market. A natural benchmark case for reference is a regime
in which any variation in the value of the exchange rate causes the central bank to move the money
supply by the same percentage amount but in the opposite direction. This benchmark case we shall
refer to as “balanced management.”
Since the focus here is on variations of exchange rates and money supplies, a reduced-formed
demand for money function is the natural way in which to phrase the argument. The model of the
private sector then becomes a simple linear relationship between the (logarithm of the) quantity of
money demanded and the (logarithm of the) exchange rate. Such a model appears in Obstfeld and
Rogoff [1996] under the rubric of the Cagan model of the exchange rate, and it is used there to
consider a flexible exchange rate regime exclusively. Our model expands on their analysis by
treating a general degree of management of the exchange rate, and by introducing dynamical
elements which enable us to distinguish between the short-run equilibrium and the steady state that
is attained eventually.
The model is as follows (in which all variables appear in a logarithmic form):
md = f⋅e + (1-f)⋅q - g⋅(de/dt)*

0<f<1 0<g

(1)

(1-d)·ms = (1-d)·mT - d⋅(e - eT)

0≤d≤1

(2)

md = ms

(3)

dq/dt = - h⋅(ms - e) .

(4)

The first equation is an expression for the reduced-form demand for domestic money.1 Goods
market, labour market, and financial market equilibrium conditions (other than those for money and
for the other market of intervention) have been used to solve for almost all of the variables which
appear in the structural-form money demand function. The variables which remain are: the
exchange rate, e, defined as the price in domestic currency of a unit of foreign exchange; a variable,
denoted by q, representing a nominal magnitude such as the domestic price level, the nominal wage
rate, or the level of nominal wealth in the domestic economy; and the expected rate of change in the
exchange rate, (de/dt)*.
This equation can be motivated by noting that it is of standard form for a reduced-form money
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demand function. If demand for money is interest rate sensitive, then the uncovered interest
rate parity condition argues that the expected rate of a depreciation of domestic currency should
appear negatively as an argument, as equation (1) indicates. A similar argument from the currency
substitution literature (for example, see Girton and Roper [1981]) would claim that this dependence
may be a direct one, without needing the intermediation of interest-bearing financial instruments.
The (logarithm of the) level of the exchange rate appears positively in the reduced-form demand for
money function (as it does in the Obstfeld/Rogoff formulation). The reason is that there are a
number of mechanisms, such as purchasing power parity and demand-side substitution effects as a
result of changing real exchange rates, which dictate that, other things equal, a higher value for the
exchange rate means a greater quantity of money is demanded. In keeping with the overshooting
result (Dornbusch [1976]) which is so often cited in this literature, it is assumed that an increase in
the exchange rate increases the quantity of money demanded somewhat less, so that f is taken to a
positive value but less than one. That is, a given percentage increase in the level of the money
supply, other things equal, causes the exchange rate to rise by a greater percentage amount.
The last variable in equation (1) is the nominal magnitude q, which is given at a point in time. The
coefficient on q is positive, of magnitude (1-f), reflecting monetary neutrality considerations. If both
nominal magnitudes in this equation, e and q, are increased by the same amount (so that their levels
are increased by the same percentage amount), then for a given degree of depreciation of the
currency, the quantity of money demanded as well increases by that amount. Equation (4) shows the
way in which q moves over time. Its dependence on the real quantity of money (m - e), mirrors the
way in which such nominal variables as domestic prices, wage levels, or nominal wealth have been
portrayed in the literature.
Equation (2) captures the central bank's management of the exchange rate. Knowing that the
quantity of money demanded depends positively on the exchange rate, the central bank realises that
by providing a negative relationship between the quantity of money supplied and the exchange rate
they will establish a unique equilibrium in the face of any shock. Furthermore, such a relationship
causes the movements of the exchange rate or the money supply to be somewhat more limited than
they would be under a polar exchange rate regime of either completely fixed or completely floating
exchange rates. Such management is always trading off deviations of the money supply, ms, from its
target value, mT, against deviations of the exchange rate, e, from its target value, eT. We assume that
the private sector does not know the values of eT and mT. As a result these magnitudes do not appear
in the reduced-form money demand equation or in the dynamical equation for q.
Equation (2) can be written as follows:
µ = µT

(4a)

where µ ≡ (1-d)·ms + d·e
and µT ≡ (1-d)·mT + d·eT.
The value of parameter d determines the extent to which exchange rates are managed. When d is
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equal to zero, there is no management of the exchange rate, although the central bank does
have complete control of the money supply (so that ms = mT). When d is equal to one, the exchange
rate is always kept at its target value, although the money supply can then range freely away from its
target.
A benchmark to which we will refer is the balanced management of the exchange rate, which is the
case of d = ½. In this case, equation (2) becomes
ms = mT - (e - eT).

(2a)

Obviously in this case the deviations of the money supply and the exchange rate from their target
values are equal, but are of opposite sign. For example, an equilibrium consistent with this
benchmark is one in which the level of the money supply exceeds its target value by five percent,
while the exchange rate falls short of its target value by five percent.
It is assumed that the economy starts off in equilibrium in which the values of the targets are equal to
zero, as is the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency. In this situation the value of
all variables is equal to zero. With this value for all magnitudes, it is natural to interpret this model
as providing a description of the deviation of all variables from the values which they would have
otherwise had, if the authorities had not engaged in a policy initiative at time to.
Throughout this paper our focus is on the values which the exchange rate and the money supply
attain in order to establish an equilibrium. Our concentration on these central variables should not
cause us to lose sight of an important fact. Namely, when comparing two different situations
generated by central bank actions, in our framework, if either of the two central variables, e or ms,
takes on the same value in the two cases, then the other variables do likewise. Furthermore, this
correspondence holds true for all the endogenous variables in the system.
The reason for this phenomenon is that the exogenous variables eT and mT appear only in equation
(2) and not in any of the structural form equations that describe the private sector and went into the
derivation of equation (1). As a result, changes in eT and mT do not alter the isomorphism between
the values of e or ms and all the other endogenous variables which are solved out in the process of
deriving equation (1). That is, once we solve for the values of e or ms, we can "back out" the values
of the subsidiary variables such as the interest rate, the current account balance, output, and the price
level. The only requirement is that we have access to the equations of the structural form which
were used to formulate equation (1).
3. A Comparison of Devaluation and Monetary Policy in the Simplest Case.
The simplest model for comparing our two policy initiatives, devaluation and monetary expansion,
is one which is consistent with early developments in international finance. It is the system of
equations above with the assumption that (de/dt)* is exogenous, or, equivalently, that g = 0. The
theory of devaluation, as represented by the contributions of Dornbusch [1973] and Mundell [1968,
1971], does not take account of possible future movements in the exchange rate. Similarly, until
Dornbusch's [1976] seminal work, monetary policy was analysed with the assumption that the
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exchange rate is expected to stay at its current value indefinitely.
When this assumption is imposed on these equations, the solution is:
e

= {(1-d)·mT + d⋅eT – (1-d)·(1-f)⋅q}/∆

(5)

= {µT – (1-d)·(1-f)·q}/∆
ms = {f⋅((1-d)·mT + d⋅eT) + d⋅(1-f)⋅q}/∆

(6)

= {f·µT + d·(1-f)·q}/∆
dq/dt = h⋅(1-f)⋅{((1-d)·mT + d⋅eT) - q}/∆

(7)

= -h·(1-f)·(q - µT)/∆
where ∆ = d+(1-d)·f . Note that 0≤d,f≤∆≤1.
To analyze these results, start with the benchmark case of balanced management of the exchange
rate, for which d = ½. Let us deal first with the case of devaluation: this is a policy initiative in
which the target price of foreign exchange is increased from its previous value of zero to its present
positive value which is denoted by ẽT. (ẽ is a numerical magnitude. Perhaps the most convenient
number to use is .1, which says that the target value for the log of nominal exchange rate has been
increased by that amount. This is roughly the same as increasing the size of the (level of the)
exchange rates by ten percent. It is assumed that mT and q continue to have values of zero.) The rise
in the value of eT causes all the variables in this solution to have positive values. Furthermore, given
that f is assumed to have a value 0<f<1, the nominal variables satisfy the inequalities:
0≤ms≤µT≤e≤ẽT .

(8)

where for each symbol the inequality portion is relevant.
That is, a devaluation of ten percent causes the money supply to increase by less than ten percent,
and the value of the exchange rate in the open market to increase by more than the money supply,
but still by less than ten percent. The reason for the inequalities is a combination of private sector
behaviour and central bank reactions. The money supply increases by less than the exchange rate
does, because of the value assumed for the parameter f. The exchange rate rises by less than the
percentage of devaluation because the policy initiative takes the form of a change in the target level
of the exchange rate. In the new equilibrium the value of the exchange rate in the open market is
higher but less than its target value. Correspondingly, consistent with equation (2a)), the deviation of
the money supply from its target level has an equal value, but is of opposite sign. This shows that
there must be a negative deviation between e and eT and a corresponding positive deviation between
ms and mT. These relationships guarantee that the inequalities in expression (8) must hold.
For the case of an increase in the target money supply (of ten percent) the set of inequalities holds

8

(8), with m̃T substituting for ẽT:
0<ms<µT<e<m̃T .

(9)

Indeed, when d = ½, there is no difference in value for any of the coefficients on m̃T and those on ẽT.
A ten percent increase in the money supply has precisely the same observable effects as does a ten
percent devaluation. There is a difference between the two in terms of the unobservable variables.
Most obviously, with monetary policy mT increases while eT remains at zero, whereas with
devaluation eT increases while mT remains the same. Accordingly, for devaluation there is a
negative deviation between e and eT, and a concomitant positive deviation between m and mT. In
contrast, for expansionary monetary policy there is a negative deviation between m and mT, and a
corresponding positive deviation between e and eT.
The reader can establish that the inequalities of (8) continue to hold for all values of d such that
0≤d≤1. In contrast, the inequalities of (9) are correct when d>(1-f)/(2-f). For smaller values of d,
the relationships are instead:
0≤ms≤µT≤m̃T≤e

(10)

The conclusion can be stated quite succinctly. When expectations of future exchange rate
movements can be ignored, for the case of balanced management of the exchange rate (for which d =
½), monetary policy and devaluation of equal percentage amounts have identical impacts on
observable variables. An increase in the target money supply by the amount ẽT (for example, ten
percent) generates identical results to a (ten percent) devaluation of amount ẽT.
As noted above, if the money supply or the exchange rate takes on the same value in response to
these two initiatives, then all other endogenous variables do too. The equilibria are the same in
terms of observable variables. They differ only insofar as the values of mT and eT, both of which are
not observable, have different values in the two cases.
Inspection of equations (5)-(7), demonstrates the more general result that in the case where monetary
policy and devaluation are carried out in a setting in which the degree of management of the
exchange rate is given at a value of d, then a monetary policy initiative which increases the target
money supply by the amount (d/(1-d))⋅ẽT has identical effects as a devaluation of amount ẽT. This
result is consistent with our intuition: when a high degree of management of the exchange rate is
being carried out (so d≈1, and the regime is very close to fixed exchange rates), then only a massive
increase in the target money supply will generate equivalent results.
In this case when the policy initiative is in the form of a ten percent devaluation, the increase in the
market value for the exchange rate is very close to the increase in the value for the target exchange
rate (so that the deviation between the two is quite small). In contrast there is an appreciable
deviation between money supplies (although somewhat less than ten percent), reflecting the increase
in the actual money supply with no change in its target level.
Also, in this case (d≈1) when identical results are obtained via a monetary policy initiative, the target
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value of the money supply must be increased a lot more than ten percent. From this initiative
there results a massive negative difference between the value of the actual money supply (which
(being an observable magnitude) increases precisely as much as it does when devaluation is the
initiating policy) and its target level, and this translates into an exchange rate deviation of somewhat
less than ten percent. The reason is that now the actual value of the exchange rate increases as much
as it does with devaluation (again, it is an observable variable), while the target value of the
exchange rate has not changed with this policy initiative.
4. Monetary Policy and Devaluation under Differing Degrees of Management of the Float
The discussion in the previous section showed that, so long as the expected rate of change of the
exchange rate can be safely ignored, for any finite degree of management of the exchange rate, there
is a monetary policy initiative which has identical observable effects as a given percentage
devaluation. The question here is whether, if we continue with the assumption about expectations of
future exchange rate changes, we can generalise these results so that comparisons of these two
initiatives can be made when there are differing degrees of management of the exchange rate. In its
starkest terms, the question can be phrased in terms of the polar exchange rate regimes as follows: Is
monetary policy under flexible exchange rates observationally equivalent to devaluation under fixed
exchange rates? We will find that the answer to this question is in the affirmative.
This experiment sets out, once again, the temptation which Allen and Kenen presented a quarter
century ago.2 Is it true that an open market operation under flexible exchange rates has the same
effect as a devalution under fixed exchange rates? To this question, we unambiguously answer yes,
so long as the market in which the exchange rate is being stabilized is the same as the market in
which the open market operation is conducted. The reason that Allen and Kenen argue that we
should not yield to this temptation is that there are “…differences…[between these two actions
that]…are not negligible….the analogy is imperfect…[it]…has been overdrawn…” according to the
results of their model, except when there is perfect capital mobility (or when domestic bonds are
effectively denominated in foreign currency). In turn, the explanation for these differences is that
the open market operation is viewed as being carried out in the money-capital market (a purchase of
domestic government bonds in exchange for money) whereas pegging of the exchange rate is carried
out in the foreign exchange market (so that foreign exchange instruments are bought and sold in
exchange for money). When there is perfect capital mobility, foreign exchange and domestic bonds
are perfect substitutes so that effectively these two operations are identical.3
We deal with the Allen-Kenen question in the situation in which the degree of stabilization of the
exchange rate is quite general in each case, and in which the degree can differ between the economy
in which the devaluation is occurring as compared with that in which money policy is being carried
out.
In order to answer this question for the general case, we return to the structural equations (1) - (4),
and assume that the policy initiatives are conducted independently. That is, they are conducted in
otherwise identical economies (so the values of the parameters f and h are the same), but in the case
of a monetary policy initiative, the value of the managed floating parameter is equal to dm; whereas
in the case of a devaluation, the value of the managed floating parameter is equal to de.
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Solving for the effects on the observable variables for the two initiatives independently we find:
In the case of a monetary initiative
e = (1-dm)·m̃T/∆m

(11)

m = f⋅(1-dm)·m̃T/∆m

(12)

dq/dt = h⋅(1-f)⋅(1-dm)·m̃T/∆m

(13)

where ∆m = (dm+(1-dm)·f).
In the case of a devaluation
e = de⋅ẽT/∆e

(14)

m = f⋅de⋅ẽT/∆e

(15)

dq/dt = h⋅(1-f)⋅de⋅ẽT/∆e

(16)

where ∆e = (de+(1-de)·f).
Clearly every variable in the case a devaluation has the same value which it did with a monetary
initiative multiplied by the factor ((de/(1-dm))⋅∆m/∆e. It follows that, when the degree of
management of the exchange rate is dm, a monetary policy initiative of amount ((de/(1-dm))⋅∆m⋅ẽT/∆e,
has precisely the same effects as a devaluation of amount ẽT does when the degree of management of
the exchange rate is equal to de.
Let us focus on the polar exchange rate cases, for the situations where the results are not degenerate.
Starting with monetary policy under flexible exchange rate, we are considering a situation in which
dm is equal to zero, so that ∆m is equal to f. We want to compare that with devaluation under fixed
exchange rates, so that de = 1. For this case, ∆e too has a value of 1, so the ratio of de/∆e has a value
of one. The conclusion of this analysis is that a monetary policy initiative under flexible exchange
rates of something less than ten percent (specifically the amount f times ten percent) will have results
which are observationally identical to those which a ten percent devaluation under a fixed exchange
rate regime would generate.
These are demonstrations of the robust conclusion that so long as expectations of future movements
of the exchange rate can be ignored, monetary policy and devaluation are identical policy initiatives
even if they are enacted under conditions which differ considerably as to the degree of management
of the float. In all cases we can find an increase in the (target) money supply that has identical
effects to those generated by a given percentage increase in the (target) value of the exchange rate.
5.

The Berglas-Dornbusch-Mundell Result
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We have shown above that in an economy in which the degree of management of the exchange rate
is given by d a monetary policy initiative of amount ẽT has the same effect on all variables, including
real ones, as a devaluation of the amount ((1-d)/d)·ẽT. Thus when d=½, a ten percent increase in the
target money supply (an expansionary monetary policy) has observationally equivalent effects as a
ten percent increase in the target value for the exchange rate (an equiproportionate devaluation).
This is true for both nominal variables and real ones.
This conclusion seems to be at variance with the conclusion of Berglas [1974], Dornbusch [1973]
and Mundell [1967, 1971] that a ten percent devalution has the same effect on real variables as a ten
percent decrease in the money supply. The intuition is that a devaluation depresses the quantity of
real money through a price shock, and equivalent results will occur through a quantity of money
shock so long as it has the same impact on the real quantity of money.4
That there is no conflict between their results and ours can be verified by writing down a real
variable, which here is the deflation of the nominal money supply by the exchange rate. The
expression for this magnitude, as in equation (7), is:
m – e = (f-1)(µT – q)/∆

(17)

This real variable is to be viewed as a synedoche for real variables in general. We see from this
expression that its value depends upon the difference between the value of µT and the value of q,
which here is most conveniently thought of as being nominal wealth. This expression shows that an
increase in µT of a given (percentage) amount has the same effects on all real variables as a decrease
in q of that (same percentage) amount.
This is the result which Berglas-Dornbusch-Mundell have derived, but they are dealing with a
special case of our model. They have assumed that the exchange rate is rigidly pegged at a point in
time, although the value of the exchange rate peg can be altered, as, of course, a devaluation
exemplifies. In terms of our notation, they are assuming that d = 1. But they are further assuming
that there is only one nominal asset in the system, money, so that the only way in which ms can
change is for q to change by an equal amount.
The explanation for this Berglas-Dornbusch-Mundell result is simple. The reason that devaluation
and an equal percentage change of opposite sign in the money supply have the same effects on all
real variables is that in their model one is comparing devaluation with an equal percentage change
(of opposite sign) in wealth. This conclusion falls immediately out of a model that is homogeneous
of degree one in all nominal variables. Effectively their model has only two short-run exogenous
nominal variables: e and q. In contrast, our model has three such variables: eT, m T, and q. We have
shown observational equivalence between a change in the target exchange rate of ẽT and a change in
the target money supply of the amount d·ẽT/(1-d) (that is, changes which have the same impact on
µT). We have also shown equivalence in terms of effects on real variables of changes in µT and
those (of opposite sign) of q. But changes in q, for us, are not monetary changes. Money is an
endogenous variables in an open economy (as Dornbusch and Mundell have emphasised in so many
different contexts, but not in their analyses of devaluation). In contrast, wealth is validly treated as
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an exogenous variable in the short run in an open economy.
6. The Path of Adjustment
The model includes a nominal magnitude, q, which has a given value in the short run. However, in
the long run, q adjusts to its steady-state value, from which it will not move until the economy is
impacted by a further shock. To find the speed of adjustment of the economy from a short-run
equilibrium to the steady state we need to take the time derivative of the model with which we have
been working. We assume that also during the path of adjustment the authorities manage the
exchange rate by intervening in the money market. As a result equation (3) continues to hold,
although we permit the possibility that the exchange rate management parameter has a different
value during the adjustment process: to take account of this possibility the value of the parameter is
denoted by d' during this period.
Equating the supply of money (equation (2)) to the demand for money (equation (1)) and time
differentiating the resulting equation, we find
(1-d’)·g⋅(d2e/dt2) - (d'+(1-d’)·f)⋅(de/dt) - (1-f)⋅h⋅e = 0

(18)

(where e is now measured relative to its steady-state value). This equation assumes that expectations
are rational, more specifically that there is perfect foresight. It is for this reason that the actual rate
of change of the exchange is substituted for the expected rate of change. In taking account of
changing expectations, we have moved beyond the discussion in the previous sections of this paper.
The solution to such a second order differential equation is of the form:
e = A⋅exp(δ1⋅t) + B⋅exp(δ2⋅t)

(19)

and the values of the δ's are the solutions of the quadratic equation
(1-d’)·g⋅δ2 -(d'+(1-d’)·f)⋅δ - (1-f)⋅h = 0 .

(20)

In turn the solutions to the quadratic equation are equal to:
δ1,2 = {(d'+(1-d’)·f) ± [(d'+(1-d’)·f)2 + 4⋅g⋅(1-f)⋅h]½/((2⋅g)·(1-d’))

(21)

We will assume that there are no speculative bubbles, so the solution we focus on has the following
value for δ:
δ = {(d'+(1-d’)·f) - [(d'+(1-d’)·f)2 + 4⋅g⋅(1-f)⋅h]½/((2⋅g)·(1-d’))

(22)

Furthermore, for small values of g and h, this simplifies to
δ = - (1-f)⋅h/(d'+(1-d’)·f).

(23)
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This shows that the speed of adjustment is independent of the value of g for small values of
this parameter.
It should be noted that if the degree of management of the float during the adjustment process differs
from that during the initial response to a shock, it is the degree of management during the adjustment
process which is the determinant of the speed of adjustment. This observation is important to
understanding some results which are derived below.
Finally, the speed of adjustment depends upon the degree of management of the float. With the
parameter f having a positive value less than one, it is straight forward that the higher the value of d',
the smaller is the (absolute) value of δ. This shows that flexible exchange rate systems have more
rapid convergence than do fixed exchange rate ones.
This conclusion points out that observational equivalence will no longer hold over the path of
adjustment if different degrees of management of the exchange rate are employed. This conclusion
does not make any statement about the nature of the policy initiatives, which could be identical. It is
a statement about the consequences of any action when differing exchange rate regimes are followed
during the process of adjustment. For example monetary policy has effects during the process of
adjustment when there is balanced management, which are different from its effects when the
exchange rate is allowed to float freely.
7. The General Solution When Differing Degrees of Management are Employed
So far our comparative static results have been confined to the case in which expectations of future
movements of the exchange rate are taken given, or equivalently when expected movements have no
effects on financial markets. This is the case represented by g = 0. These assumptions provided a
fruitful starting point because they enabled us to make comparisons with conclusions in the literature
of international finance. But these assumptions are hardly realistic in the present world in which
capital flows and portfolio balance considerations seem to be the most important elements in
explaining exchange rate movements. With the introduction of expectations into the analysis, our
central question returns: under what circumstances are devaluation and monetary policy
observationally equivalent?
The discussion in the previous section hints at the correct answer: when the degree of management
of the exchange rate during the adjustment process is identical for these two initiatives, then they
maintain their observational equivalence. To confirm this conclusion we need to derive the general
result in which the degree of management of the exchange rate takes on four possible values: one
for each of the initiatives, and, in each such case, for the two time periods; for the initial jump to a
new short-run equilibrium, and for the process of adjustment. In all cases we are focussing on the
value of d. As before subscripts denote the value which d has depending upon whether a
devaluation initiative is undertaken (de) or a monetary policy initiative is undertaken (dm).
Unprimed d parameters refer to values which hold during the instantaneous jump, and primed d
parameters refer to values which hold during the adjustment process. (For example, de‘ refers to the
degree of management of the float during the adjustment process when a devaluation initiative is
undertaken.)
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The key to solving the model for this case is to note that in the short run after the instantaneous
jump, the economy satisfies three conditions. First, the private sector, consistent with its constraints
(namely that q is a given during this timeframe and that expectations must be consistent with what
actually transpires), must be maximising its objective function. Specifically, this implies that
equation (1) is satisfied. In addition, the short-run equilibrium must be consistent with the central
bank's instantaneous reaction function. The reaction function is designed to cope with and counter
sudden changes in the value of the exchange rate, of which the present shock (even though
originating in the government sector) is a clear example. Finally, the short-run equilibrium must be
on the reaction function to which the authorities will adhere during the adjustment process. (Perhaps
a further condition worth mentioning is that in the new steady state, which must also be consistent
with the adjustment-process reaction function, all nominal variables, e, m and q have increased by
the same (percentage) amount.)
Specifically the equations which are satisfied are
-d/(1-d)⋅(e0 - eT) = f⋅e0 + [g⋅(1-f)⋅h)⋅(e0-eT)]/(f·(1-d’)+d')
mT + (d/(1-d))·(eT-e0) = f·e0 + g·δ·(e0-eλ)

(24)

The left-hand-side of this equation is the money supply using instantaneous jump reaction function,
where we have denoted the short-run value of the exchange rate by e0. The right-hand-side is the
demand for money in the short run (for which q = 0), and in which the expected rate of change of the
exchange rate (de/dt) has been written in the form δ⋅(e0 - eλ), where eλ is the long-run value which all
nominal variables attain.
The second equation is:
(1-d)·mT + d·eT = (1-d)·m0 + d·e0

(25)

This equality is a repeat with current notation of equation (4a).
Finally, we have
(1-d’)·m0 + d’·e0 = eλ .

(26)

This equation states that the value of the monetary target index using the weights along the path of
adjustment equal the value of the index at the long-run equilibrium. In that equilibrium the value of
all nominal variables is eλ, so likewise is the value of the index.
The solution to these equations in the short run is
e0 = µT·(1+(1-d’)·g·δ)/∆λ

(27)

m0 = µT·(f +(1-d’)·g·δ)/∆λ

(28)
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where ∆λ = d + (1-d)·f + (1-d’)·g·δ.
These solutions demonstrate that so long as the same degrees of management of the exchange rate
(for the instantaneous jump and during the process of adjustment) are in force, a monetary policy
initiative is observationally equivalent to a devaluation. It should be noted that this result does not
depend on the degree of jump management being equal in value to the degree of intertemporal
management.
8. Management during the Path of Adjustment
As before let us deal with our two initiatives separately, assuming that the degree of management is
dependent upon the initiative undertaken. In that case we find the following expressions for e0 and
m0.
For the case of devaluation:
e0 = de⋅eT·(1+g·δe·(1-de’))/∆e

(29)

m0 = de⋅eT·(f+g·δe·(1-de’))/∆e

(30)

where ∆e = d+(1-d)·f+g·δe·(1-de’)
For the case of monetary policy:
e0 = (1-dm)·mT·(1+g·δm·(1-dm’))/∆m

(31)

m0 = e0 = (1-dm)·mT·(f+g·δm·(1-dm’))/∆m

(32)

where ∆m = d+(1-d)·f+g·δm·(1-dm’)
It is straight forward to note that when the degree of management of the exchange rate is same along
the adjustment path, so that de' = dm' (≡ d'), there continues to be observational equivalence. That is a
value of m̃T equal to
de·ẽT·∆m/((1-dm)·∆m
generates the same values for e0 and m0 (and for all other magnitudes in the economy) as does a
devaluation of amount ẽT.
This shows that observational equivalence does not hinge upon there being the same degree of
management during the instantaneous jump. But obviously this observation raises the question as
whether equivalence continues to hold when there are different degrees of management during the
path of adjustment. The easiest way to show this to calculate the ratio e0/m0 for the two policy
initiatives.
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For monetary policy this ratio is equal to
{e0/m0}m = (1+g·δm·(1-dm’))/(f+g·δm·(1-dm’))

(33)

whereas for devaluation this ratio is equal to
{e0/m0}e = (1+g·δe·(1-de’))/(f+g·δe·(1-de’))

(34)

These expressions show that these ratios satisfy the following inequalities:
1<{e0/m0}m<{e0/m0}e<1/f
if dm'<de'. The middle inequality sign needs to be reversed if de'<dm'. And it needs to be changed to
an equality sign if de'=dm’.
This analysis shows that a necessary condition for observational equivalence is equality of the
degree of intertemporal management of the exchange rate. In contrast, the degree of instantaneous
management of the exchange rate is irrelevant for observational equivalence. The instantaneous
degree is a determinant of the size of the initiative which needs to be undertaken in order to generate
identical results. But since the size of the initiative is not known to the public, this does not violate
observational equivalence.
In contrast the degree of intertemporal management determines not only the size of the instantaneous
movements of the exchange rate and the money supply but also the proportions in which they move.
As a result observational equivalence no longer holds when the degree of management is dependent
on the policy initiative which is undertaken.
9. Literature Review
Beginning with the Mundell-Fleming model, the literature in international finance has analyzed
policy actions under the polar regimes of fixed and flexible exchange rates. For example, it is a
commonplace in standard textbooks to contrast the efficacy of monetary policy under a flexible
exchange rate regime with its impotence under a fixed rate regime.
This paper argues that in order to probe the symmetry of policy actions and the circumstances when
those actions yield equivalent results, it is appropriate to employ a regime of managed floating, since
in this case the policies under study typically have non-degenerate effects. In particular
expansionary monetary policy under a managed floating regime will have an impact on the economy
so long as the degree of management is bounded.
Our specific interest is in the circumstances under which devaluation and monetary policy have
observationally equivalent effects. The conclusion is that under simple conditions, there is a
percentage increase in the money supply which has identical effects on all observable variables as a
given percentage of devaluation. This conclusion points out that although these initiatives are
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identified by different names, in fact they are exactly the same policy. The intuition behind
this result is quite simple: as with any monopolist, a Central Bank's decision to alter the price of its
product, is simultaneously a decision to alter the quantity of production, and vice versa.
In open economy monetary economics, the close connection between decisions about price (the
exchange rate) and those about quantity (the size of the money supply) have been remarked on for at
least one hundred years. Thus, Keynes [1924] talking about the foreign exchange value of the
French franc refers to the "first principles" derived from his Tract on Monetary Reform as indicating
a simple relationship between the exchange rate and the quantity of money.5
Sufficient conditions for observational equivalence to hold are: that the markets of intervention to
manage the exchange rate be the same as the markets in which policy initiatives are undertaken; and
that the same finite degree of management of the exchange rate be used for the two policies. While
the first condition seems essential for this equivalence, the second is not necessary. So long as one
deals with a specific timeframe, equivalence continues to hold independent of the exchange rate
regime. However, once one considers alternative timeframes and the process of adjustment in
moving between them, then clearly differences do arise. But these differences are not due to the
policies per se but are instead due to the fact that the nature of the economy's adjustment path
depends upon the exchange rate regime which is in force.
This simple equivalence result contrasts with the separate paths which analyses of these two policy
initiatives have followed in recent times. The most dramatic statement of the contrary point of view
was made by Johnson [1958]. In it, he contends that these two policies fall into disjoint categories:
devaluation is an "expenditure-switching" device; whereas "monetary restriction" is an "expenditurechanging" one. This categorisation has had a major impact on discussion of these issues right up to
the present, as is exemplified by Frankel [2004].
Specifically textbooks continue to follow this line of thinking perpetuating the claim that
monetary actions and devaluation are different policy instruments. Thus, Kenen [1994, pp 362-6],
Ethier [1995, pp 519-20], Caves, Frankel and Jones [1996, pp 407-9], and McCallum [1996, pp 1434] claim that devaluation can be undertaken without short-run monetary effects. For example,
Kenen develops a diagram (page 363) in which expenditure policy is on the vertical axis and the
exchange rate is on the horizontal axis. The two variables can be changed independently in an
economy because "Its government pegs the exchange rate but is free to change the peg...Its central
bank controls the money supply..." Ethier finds that devaluation causes a balance of payments
surplus that will increase the money supply over time unless sterilised. In contrast, monetary policy
sets up a temporary equilibrium which prevails only until domestic citizens have bought enough
bonds from abroad to replace those sold to the authorities p 56. Finally, Caves, Frankel and Jones
p408 and McCallum pp 143-4 envisage a devaluation without any shift in the LM curve.
Of greater consequence, all these authors claim that devaluation and monetary policy have
the opposite effects on various accounts of the balance of payments. Dealing with the current
account, Caves, Frankel and Jones [pp 405, 424 and (in a different framework) p 443] finds that a
monetary expansion causes a deficit, while devaluation causes a surplus [pp 408, 427 and 444].
Kenen makes the same claim on pp 363-369, as does Ethier on p 519. McCallum does not deal with
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the Current Account, but does find that expansionary monetary policy leads to an
official settlements deficit, whereas a devaluation draws in reserves from abroad.
In so far as these textbooks are representative of thinking about policies in the open
economy, it is fair to say that the standard view at the present time is that devaluation and
expansionary monetary policy are two independent policies with very different consequences.
Therefore, the conclusions of this paper are directly at variance with the prevailing view.6
10. Conclusion
This paper has found that devaluation and expansionary monetary policy have very similar effects in
standard models of a small open economy which stabilises its exchange rate to a degree that is set
parametrically. When expectations are myopic the key condition that must be met is that the
markets for intervention to stabilise the exchange rate must be the same as those in which the
monetary initiative is carried out. An alternative assumption, made by a number of well-known
economists, is that there exists only one financial instrument in the economy and that pegging of the
exchange rate takes places in the goods market. Such models arrive at conclusions which are
diametrically opposed to what we find here and to what is observed in the data. In a model with
perfect foresight, a subsidiary condition for observational equivalence is that the degree of
management of the float during the process of adjustment to long run equilibrium be the same for
these two policy initiatives.
The identity we find between expansionary monetary policy and devaluation presents a dilemma
when one looks at recent research in the theory of devaluation. This research (Frankel [2004])
continues to find that devaluation can be contractionary (as Cooper [1971] reported more than thirty
years ago. Yet no economist believes expansionary monetary policy to be contractionary.
Obviously there is a contradiction here: one with which we intend to deal in our next paper on this
subject.

19

References
Allen, Polly and Kenen, Peter [1980], Asset Markets, Exchange Rates, and Economic Integration: A
Synthesis, Cambridge University Press.
Berglas, Eitan [1974], “Devaluation, monetary policy, and border tax adjustments,” The Canadian
Journal of Ecomics, VII, 1(February), 1-11.
Caves, Richard, Frankel, Jeffrey, and Jones, Ronald [1996], World Trade and Payments: An
Introduction, seventh edition, Harper Collins.
Cooper, Richard [1971], “Currency devaluation in developing countries,” Essays in International
Finance, 86, Internal Finance Section, Princeton, N.J.
Dornbusch, Rudiger [1973], "Currency depreciation, hoarding and relative prices, Journal of
Political Economy, 81, 5(October), 893-915.
----------- [1976], "Expectations and exchange rate dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, 84,
6(December), 1161-76.
Ethier, Wilfrid [1995], Modern International Economics, third edition, W W Norton.
Fleming, J Marcus [1962], "Domestic financial policies under fixed and under floating exchange
rates," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 9 (November), 369-79.
Frankel, Jeffery [2004], “Contractionary currency crashes in developing countries,” The 5th MundellFleming Lecture, IMF Annual Research Conference, IMF Staff Papers, forthcoming.
Frenkel, Jacob and Johnson, Harry, eds [1977], The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments,
University of Toronto Press.
Frenkel, Jacob, and Mussa, Michael [1985], “Asset markets, exchange rates, and the balance of
payments,” in Jones, Ronald W. and Kenen, Peter B. (eds.) Handbook of International Economics,
volume 2, North-Holland, Amsterdam, chapter 14 (679-747).
Girton, Lance and Roper, Don [1981], "Theory and implications of currency substitution," Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 13, 1(February), 12-30.
Harberger, Arnold C. [1950], Currency depreciation, income and the balance of trade," Journal of
Political Economy, 58, 1(February), 47-60.
Helpman, Elhanan [1981], "An exploration of the theory of exchange rate regimes," Journal of
Political Economy, 89, 5(October), 865-90.
Johnson, Harry [1958], "Toward a general theory of the balance of payments," Trade and Economic

20

Growth. Reprinted in Jacob Frenkel and Harry Johnson, eds, [1977], The Monetary Approach
to the Balance of Payments, University of Toronto Press.
Kenen, Peter B. [1994], The International Economy, third edition, Cambridge University Press.
Keynes, John Maynard [1924], "Commentary" from The Nation and Athenaeum, March 15, 1924.
As reprinted in The Collected Works of John Maynard Keynes, [198?], Macmillan and The
Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society, Volume XIX, part 1, p 177.
Lucas, Robert [1976], "Econometric policy evaluation: a critique." In Karl Brunner and Allan H.
Meltzer, eds., The Phillips Curve and Labour Markets. Amsterdam: North Holland.
McCallum, Bennett [1996], International Monetary Economics, Cambridge University.
Mundell, Robert A. [1963], "Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible
Exchange Rates," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 29 (November), 475-85.
______________, [1967] "International Disequilibrium and the Adjustment Process," in John H
Adler (ed), Capital Movements and Economic Development, St Martin's Press, New York, pp 44162. Printed in an adapted form as "Barter theory and the monetary mechanism of adjustment," in
Mundell, Robert A. [1968], International Economics, Macmillan, Chapter 8.
------------ [1971], Monetary Theory, Goodyear Publishing, Pacific Palisades, CA.
Obstfeld, Maurice and Rogoff, Kenneth [1996], Foundations of International Macroeconomics,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Salvatore, Dominick [1998], International Economics, 6th edition, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle
River, N.J.
Tsiang, S. C. [1961], “The role of money in trade-balance stability: synthesis of the elasticity and
absorption approaches,” American Economic Review, 51, 912-36,
Footnotes
1

The model implicitly assumes that the markets of intervention to stabilize the exchange rate
are the same as the markets in which the monetary policy initiative is carried out. It this is not
true, then the excess demands created in differing markets will cause the demand function for
money (equation (1)) to shift in one case and not in the other. The equivalence between
devaluation and monetary policy would thereby be negated.
2
Allen and Kenen [1980, 40] assume that the exchange rate is pegged by intervention in the
foreign exchange market, while an open market operation is conducted in the domestic bond
market. In contrast, we are assuming in this paper that the pegging operation is carried out in the
same market as the open market operation. This is a key assumption guaranteeing the
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equivalence of the two policy initiatives which we consider. In the limit of perfect capital
mobility, these two markets are effectively the same, and Allen and Kenen come to the same
conclusion as do we.
3
This conclusion side-steps some of the issues which Allen and Kenen raise concerning
monetary neutrality in an economy in which there exist two domestic-currency-denominated
market instruments. It is precisely these issues which causes these authors to conclude that the
differences between devaluation and monetary policy as not being negligible, since monetary
neutrality holds in one case but not the other.
The reconciliation with the analysis in the present paper is that when the open market operation
is carried out in the foreign exchange market (which Mundell [1963] calls “an alternative form of
monetary policy”), then the effects are precisely the same as a devaluation (since all modelers
are picturing the exchange rate as being stabilized by interventions in the foreign exchange
market).
4

Mundell [1967, 1971] does not specify how the exchange rate is pegged in his analyses.
Dornbusch [1973] states specifically that domestic money is bought and sold for foreign
exchange. But since foreign exchange is not held by domestic residents (nor is domestic money
held by foreign residents), by pegging the exchange rate the authorities are setting the domesticcurrency price of foreign goods. Therefore they are effectively intervening in the foreign goodsdomestic money market. The results that Berglas-Dornbusch-Mundell report are thus relevant
for economies that peg the exchange rate by intervention in the money-goods market.
5.. 5..Keynes [1924, p 177] refers to such a relationship as being based on the "first principles" of
exchange rate determination. Alluding specifically to the French franc at the time, he states that
"The value of the franc will be determined, first, by the quantity, present and prospective, of the
francs in circulation; and, second, by the amount of purchasing power which it suits the public to
hold in that shape."
6.. The reader may note a certain similarity with the conclusions at which Helpman [1981] arrived.
Our point is quite different from his in that for the two nominal shocks considered by us, the
equilibria are precisely the same, rather than being so just in real terms. Only these nominal shocks
generate identical results, contrary to Helpman for whom shocks of any sort have precisely the same
real equilibria. Finally, Helpman's results are specific to the foreign-currency indexed economy of
his model, whereas ours apply to any model which satisfy the two conditions identified above.

